The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating the Right of Publicity by Belo, Vladimir P.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 19 | Number 1 Article 5
1-1-1996
The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away
with Violating the Right of Publicity
Vladimir P. Belo
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J.
133 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol19/iss1/5
The Shirts Off Their Backs:
Colleges Getting Away with




I. Defining the Right of Publicity ........................................... 135
II. The Right of Publicity Going Beyond Traditional
Notions of Name and Likeness ..................... 139
A. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co ........... 139
B. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc ................ 141
C. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. ........... 142
D. White v. Samsung Electronics America ............. 143
III. Effect of Right of Publicity Law Applied to College
Sports M erchandise .............................................................. 145
A. The Jersey as an Athlete's "Identity" .......................... 145
B. Policy Reasons Favoring the Athlete .............. 147
IV. Solutions to the Problem of Unjustly Marketing Players'
Identities ............................................................................. 148
A. History of the NCAA .................................................... 149
B. Allowing a Cause of Action for Right of Publicity
V iolation .......................................................................... 150
C. Compensation to the Student-Athlete ........................ 151
D. Trust Funds for the Student-Athlete ........................... 154
V . C onclusion ............................................................................. 156
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1997; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1992. The author would like to thank Julie Garcia for her help
in developing this Note. The author also wishes to thank Portia Belo and Heather Bouvier for
their research help and moral support, respectively.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Introduction
The popularity of college sports in the United States has led to
the proliferation of college sports merchandising. The market in items
featuring college logos has substantially grown, especially in the last
dozen years. Total retail sales of college merchandise reached $2.1
billion in 1993.1 This figure has grown from $1 billion in 1989,2 and
$250 million in 1984.3 This revenue means big royalty figures for the
colleges, particularly the ones that enjoy success on the playing field.4
Today, college merchandising involves more than just sweatshirts
and hats bearing a university's name and logo. The universities have
begun licensing products that seek to capitalize on the popularity of
actual players in addition to the popularity of the schools and their
athletic teams. An intriguing trend has been the marketing of replica
game jerseys of college teams, featuring the uniform number of a
school's star player or players.5
Under the current system, the players receive no direct financial
benefit from the sale of college merchandise, even those items utilizing
their status as star players on their teams. The colleges and the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the governing
body for college athletics, control the rights to license these products,
including the game jerseys. Schools may enjoy the revenue from the
sales, but the NCAA limits compensation to the athletes. NCAA rules
generally limit compensation to the athlete to a package including the
1. Michael Hiestand, Sports Biz, U.S.A. TODAY, June 9, 1994, at C3.
Z Id.
3. Greg Johnson, Colleges Score Merchandising Touchdown Retail, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1993, at D1 (explaining growth of merchandising has led several colleges to set up outlets in
shopping centers and malls).
4. For example, the University of North Carolina made almost $500,000 in royalties from
souvenir sales after it defeated Michigan to win the 1993 NCAA men's basketball championship.
The royalty figure was based on souvenir sales exceeding $35 million. John Lindsay, Hogs to
Reap Rewards-NCAA Title Will Boost Arkansas Souvenir Sales, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, April 21,
1994, at D1. The University of Nebraska realized $2.18 million in royalties from license and logo
fees during the off-season following its national championship during the 1994 season. See Sports
Briefing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 24, 1995, at 18B.
5. See, e.g., 1996 ATHLON SPORTS COLLEGE FOOTBALL EDITION 184 (advertisement for
"replica" and "game" college football jerseys). Among the jerseys pictured for sale include a
Florida jersey with number 7 (the number worn by quarterback Danny Wuerffel) and a Florida
State jersey with number 28 (worn by Warrick Dunn). Other jerseys featured numbers worn by
former players, including Nebraska #15 (Tommie Frazier), Ohio State #14 (Bobby Hoying), Penn
State #10 (Bobby Engram), Michigan #21 (Tim Biakabutuka), and Nebraska #1 (Lawrence
Phillips). Incidentally, all five of these players played for their respective schools in 1995.
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value of tuition and fees, room and board, and books to attend school;
anything more threatens the athlete's amateur status and, thus, his
eligibility to compete in college athletics.6
This note addresses the unfairness of colleges and universities
capitalizing on merchandise specifically designed to identify with the
schools' higher-profile athletes.7 The note suggests that the marketing
of these jerseys violates common law and statutory rights to publicity
by unjustly enriching colleges and their licensees who commercially
exploit the popularity and star value of the athletes. The note then
examines possible solutions to the problem, including the allowance of
a right of publicity cause of action for the student-athlete, as well as
enabling the student-athlete to enjoy payment for the marketing of
merchandise bearing his jersey number. This latter solution is
accompanied by an analysis of the NCAA's limited compensation
rules. Finally, the note suggests another possible solution: the creation
of a trust fund for the athletes whereby the proceeds from the
marketing of this merchandise can directly benefit them. Due to
the NCAA's traditional notions of amateurism and the legitimization
by the courts of the NCAA's role in preserving amateur athletics, the
trust fund solution may be the most realistic.
I
Defining the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity has been closely connected with the
individual right to privacy. In 1960, Dean William Prosser set forth the
basic types of torts which may be grouped under the category of
invasion of privacy. In setting forth the law of privacy, Prosser
suggested that there were distinct causes of action that an individual
had, depending on the type of violation of one's person. These causes
of action include:
6. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206,210 (1990)(citing NCAA, 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 136 (1989)).
7. This issue is not an entirely new one. Current Detroit Pistons basketball player Grant
Hill, a former player at Duke University, complained in 1993 that the university had been
bringing in considerable revenue selling game jerseys with his number 33. Hill, a senior at the
university at that time, noted that the jerseys were being sold for $120 each. Laura Bollig, NABC
'Issues Summit' Notes, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 25, 1993, at 6.
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1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness.
8
While Prosser grouped the misappropriation of a person's name
or likeness under the right to privacy category, this cause of action can
more appropriately be characterized under the separate label of "right
of publicity." This separate categorization was suggested by Professor
Nimmer in a 1954 article,9 after concluding that the right to privacy
doctrine did not protect against the commercial exploitation of one's
identity, particularly in the case of a well-known figure.
10
The inherent inadequacy of an invasion of privacy cause of action
was reflected in the 1941 New York case of Miller v. Madison Square
Garden." In that case, an official program published, without consent,
the name and photograph of a well-known figure. The plaintiff sued
under the New York privacy statute and proved that the defendant
had violated the law by using his name and picture without his
permission.12 However, because the plaintiff freely admitted that he
had not suffered any "ridicule or humiliation" as a result of the
misappropriation, the court granted him only six cents in damages. 3
While this result was consistent with invasion of privacy law, it was not
consistent with what the just result should have been. One
commentator observed that, in reality, "the true commercial value of
plaintiff's identity was worth a great deal more than six cents to the
defendant. The old 'privacy' rubric was simply inadequate to cope
with what Nimmer called 'publicity value.""
'14
Quite simply, the right of publicity is designed to protect a
person's financial interest' This is distinct from the rest of Prosser's
8. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
9. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
10. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.8 (1989).
11. 28 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1941).
12. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 1.8.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis in original).
15. "It seems sufficiently evident that appropriation is quite a different matter from
intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light in the public eye. The interest protected is
not so much a mental as a proprietary one." Prosser, supra note 8, at 406.
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right to privacy torts, which are designed to protect personal interests,
such as a person's well-being and the right to be free of negative public
discourse.'6 Furthermore, public figures subjected to public exposure
and publicity are often not harmed by the attention; to the contrary,
they often relish publicity as a chance to further their careers. 17
Publicity, however, is not without its limits. There exists a right of
publicity to "own, protect, and profit from the commercial value of
one's name, likeness, activities, or identity, and to prevent the
unauthorized exploitation of these traits by others."' 8
The earliest case recognizing the right of publicity as a distinct
doctrine involved the likenesses of baseball players featured on
trading cards. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,9 Haelan contracted with a professional ballplayer to gain the
exclusive right to use his photograph in connection with the sales of its
gum.' Haelan alleged that Topps, the defendant, induced the player
to give it a similar authorization?' The defendant argued that there
was no such tortious interference. Topps contended that the breach
was induced by an independent third party who obtained the rights
from the ballplayer before assigning them to the defendant. With that
being the case, there would have been no tortious interference by the
defendant.' Topps then contended that Haelan's contract with the
plaintiff "created [no] more than a release of liability, because a man
has no legal interest in the publication of his picture other than his
right of privacy, i.e., a personal and non-assignable right not to have
his feelings hurt by such a publication."' 3 The Second Circuit
explained that "in addition to and independent of that right to privacy
16. See Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or Public
Domain?, 19 NOVA L. REv. 1013,1025 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1014.
19. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. Id. at 867.
21. The court stated that Topps engaged in tortious interference with contract "[i]f
defendant, knowing of the contract, deliberately induced the ball-player to break that promise."
Id. at 867-68.
22. Id. at 868.
23. Id. (emphasis added). The defendant argued that Haelan:
had no right to assert, for "privacy" was only a personal and non-assignable right by a
ballplayer not to have his feelings hurt by commercial use on baseball cards . . . all
that the ballplayers' contracts consisted of was a release or waiver of the right to sue for
an invasion of "privacy"-no more. As a mere holder of a waiver or "settlement,"
plaintiff could not sue defendant.
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 1.7.
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(which New York derives from statute), a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph . . . ." The court went on to
recognize the existence of a right of publicity, as well as the privilege
to freely assign that right to others. 25
With the emergence of the Haelan decision and the analyses of
Nimmer and Prosser, the right of publicity was born. A common law
right of publicity was later recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. ' In this case,
the plaintiff alleged a right of publicity violation based on material
used on an evening newscast. The defendant filmed a segment of the
plaintiff's human cannonball stunt act and broadcasted it without
permission. 7 The Supreme Court held that the broadcast posed "a
substantial threat to the economic value" of the plaintiff's
performance. 28 This threat violated his right of publicity and enabled
the defendant to benefit by this exploitation.2 Not only did this case
recognize the right of publicity cause of action, it also upheld this right
even in light of the "strong countervailing right of the media,
guaranteed by both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, to report on newsworthy matters in the public
interest."3°
Cases like Zacchini recognize that the right of publicity exists by
way of judicial decision. While most states recognizing the doctrine
have done so through case law, other states have addressed this issue
through statutory recognition of the right of publicity.31
24. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
25. Id. The court recognized that "it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances . Id.
26. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
27. Id. at 564.
28. Id. at 575.
29. "'No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay."' Id. at 576
(quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
30. H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the
Right of Publicity, 17 COLU.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 7 (1992). The United States Supreme Court, in
Zacchini, overruled the Ohio Supreme Court, which had held that Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
was constitutionally privileged. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569.
31. As of 1992, 13 states had enacted statutes addressing the right of publicity, while 23
others had the right established through judicial decision. Alexander Margolies, Sports Figures,
Right of Publicity, 1 SPORTS L.J. 359, 360-61 (1994). By 1995, 14 states had right of publicity
statutes: California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York,
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The Right of Publicity Going Beyond Traditional Notions of
Name and Likeness
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decision in Haelan created the right of publicity doctrine, which
focused on an individual's right to protect his name and likeness-
indeed, "name or likeness" are the very terms used by Prosser., As
the doctrine has developed, however, the attributes possessed by an
individual that are protected by the right of publicity have expanded
beyond just names and photographs. As a general proposition,
protection has been granted with regard to "representations which are
recognizable as likenesses of the complaining individual,"'  with
identifiability of the individual being the key fact to determine.
Clearly, a photograph of a celebrity may fit this description, just
as the blatant use of a celebrity's name without permission would also
constitute a violation if used for commercial purposes.-' While the Ali
case demonstrated that the right of publicity cause of action can be
sustained without the explicit use of one's name or face, cases decided
before and after Ali suggest that the scope of the publicity right goes
even further. The extension of the rule makes it entirely plausible that
marketing a college jersey with the same number a star player wears
for each game is a use of the player's identity that falls under the right
of publicity rubric. The following cases, listed chronologically,
illustrate the growth of the doctrine.
A. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.35
As was the case in Ali, the facts in Motschenbacher did not reveal
that the defendant used the plaintiff's actual name or picture in
association with its alleged violation of the right of publicity. The
plaintiff in Motschenbacher, a famous race-car driver, sought relief
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Derek C. Crownover, Minor
League Rights of Publicity Are Major League, 2 SpoRTs L.J. 227,231 n.11 (1995).
32. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389.
33. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(holding portrait of nude man
seated in the comer of boxing ring recognizable as former heavyweight champion Muhammad
Ali, without using Ali's name or showing his face); cf. Margolies, supra note 31, at 372 ("A
plaintiff will only have a cause of action if he or she can be recognized from the purported
likeness").
34. See James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 652-53 (1973).
35. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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when the defendant used his race car in a television commercial for
cigarettes. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a lower
court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Motschenbacher
could sustain a cause of action.37 The court rejected the district court's
rationale for granting R.J. Reynolds' summary judgment motion,
which was that the plaintiff's name or photograph was not used in the
advertisement.38 The actual likeness of the plaintiff did not have to be
present in the advertisement: it was enough that an endorsement
might be inferred by those who recognized the peculiar markings of
his car.39 Since an endorsement by the plaintiff might be inferred from
the advertisement, the use of the distinctly marked car without the
plaintiff's permission could violate his right of publicity. 0 Despite
agreeing with the district court that the plaintiff's likeness was
unrecognizable in the advertisement, the court of appeals stressed that
"the [lower] court's further conclusion of law to the effect that the
driver is not identifiable as plaintiff is erroneous in that it wholly fails
to attribute proper significance to the distinctive decorations
appearing on the car."'4 The distinctive car was an extension of
Motschenbacher's identity. 42 By using the well-known car in its
advertisement without the plaintiff's permission, the defendant had
reaped what it did not sow; it obtained an endorsement, a commercial
value, from Motschenbacher without receiving consent or giving
compensation.
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id. at 822, 825-26.
38. The district court found that the person driving the car in the advertisement "is
unrecognizable and unidentified" and that "a reasonable inference could not be drawn that he is,
or could reasonably be understood to be plaintiff .... Id. at 822-23.
39. Id. at 827. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 10 at § 4.15[C] (in Motschenbacher, the focus
was not on the car, but on the object "as a means of identifying [the] plaintiff.").
40. Because Motschenbacher recognized a cause of action, it effectively extended the
concept of "identity" beyond the person. The extension of this to Motschenbacher' race car
made this, to some, "the most radical extension of protection" given by right of publicity law. See
Hetherington, supra note 30, at 10; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 4.15[C] ("Objects
closely related to a person").
41. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
42. The court noted that the markings on the car pictured in the advertisement "were not
only peculiar to the plaintiff's cars but they caused some persons to think the car in question was
plaintiff's and to infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff." Id. (footnote omitted).
[VOL. 19:133HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ.
B. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.
43
Elroy "Crazylegs" Hirsch was a football star of national
prominence with the University of Wisconsin, the University of
Michigan, and professionally with the National Football League's Los
Angeles Rams. 4 During his collegiate football career, "Hirsch's
unique running style, which looked something like a whirling
eggbeater," earned him the nickname "Crazylegs." In this case,
Hirsch sought damages for the unauthorized use of the nickname by
the defendant, which had associated the name "Crazylegs" with a
shaving gel for women.4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized a common law cause of
action for violation of a person's right of publicity.4 In doing so, the
court analyzed and accepted the misappropriation of identity tort
identified by Dean Prosser in Privacy, while also setting it apart as
separate and distinct from causes of action based on the right to
privacy.4 The court also noted the public policy considerations behind
its ruling. Foremost among these reasons is the protection of the
publicity value in one's name to prevent the unjust enrichment of
those who appropriate this value without a license or consent.'
The court sustained a cause of action for Hirsch, despite the fact
that the plaintiff's actual name was not used in the defendant's
advertisement. The court reasoned that "[a]ll that is required is that
the name clearly identify the wronged person. In the instant case, it is
not disputed at this juncture of the case that the nickname identified
the plaintiff Hirsch.!5 The court went on to note that the name
"Crazylegs" could potentially meet the requirement of clearly
identifying Elroy Hirsch: such a determination was a question of fact
for the jury.51
43. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
44. Id. at 131.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 130.
47. ld. at 134.
48. Id. at 133-34. The Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed the ideas of Prosser, Nimmer,
and the opinion by Judge Frank in Haelan Laboratories to "stress the significant distinction
between the tort of appropriation and other torts involving invasion of privacy." Id. at 134.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 137.
51. Id. at 138. See also Prosser, supra note 8, at 404 (explaining a fictitious name may be so
connected with an individual as to protect it against unauthorized commercial use).
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C. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc
52
The Carson case provides another example of how far the law of
publicity has gone in defining what forms of "identity" are
appropriately protected. Johnny Carson, the former host of The
Tonight Show, brought suit against the defendant based on the latter's
use of the famed Carson monologue introduction cue of "Here's
Johnny."'  A federal district court dismissed Carson's complaint,
holding that the right of publicity "extend[s] only to a 'name or
likeness,' and 'Here's Johnny' did not qualify."'
The Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit dismissed the lower
court's reading of the right of publicity doctrine as "too narrow,"
arguing that "[i]f the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited,
there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his 'name or
likeness' is used. Carson's identity may be exploited even if his name,
John W. Carson, or his picture is not used."5 Citing Motschenbacher,
Ali, and Hirsch, the court accepted "Here's Johnny" as an identifying
characteristic of Johnny Carson, despite the obvious fact that his name
was not explicitly used.1 In recognizing the defendant's actions as
misappropriation of identity, the court of appeals recognized the view
that a celebrity's identity could be appropriated in various ways,
beyond the use of name or likeness.' The famous introduction of
"Here's Johnny" was considered to be one of those waysi
s
Following the Sixth Circuit's decision in Carson, it is evident that
right of publicity law had come a long way from its beginnings in
Haelan Laboratories. From "names and likenesses" being the
operative terms, courts developed the doctrine to include aspects of
52. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 833.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 835-36.
57. "It is our view that, under the existing authorities, a celebrity's legal right of publicity is
invaded whenever his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes . . . . It is
not fatal to appellant's claim that appellee did not use his 'name."' Id. at 837. The court pointed
out that using the plaintiff's real name in another form, such as "J. William Carson Portable
Toilet," would not have violated his right of publicity. "The reason is that, though literally using
appellant's 'name,' the appellee would not have appropriated Carson's identity as a celebrity.
Here there was an appropriation of Carson's identity without using his 'name."' Id.
5& But see id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting): "The majority's extension of the right of publicity
to include phrases or other things which are merely associated with the individual permits
a popular entertainer or public figure, by associating himself or herself with a common phrase, to
remove those words from the public domain."
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identity which included nicknames, performances, or even distinctive
voices.' In a subsequent decision that spawned much critical
commentary, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals developed the
doctrine in a more far-reaching fashion.
D. White v. Samsung Electronics America6°
The White case probably displays the broadest scope to which
right of publicity law has developed in recognizing aspects of a
person's identity beyond name and likeness. This case arose out of the
defendant's advertising campaign, which was designed to depict
certain contemporary personalities or features of mainstream culture
and how they would be in the 21st century. The advertisements were
humorous in nature, since they were based on "hypothesizing
outrageous future outcomes for the cultural items . "..."61
The plaintiff in this case was Vanna White, the celebrity letter-
turner from television's Wheel of Fortune game show. 2 White brought
suit based on one of the humorous effects created by the
advertisements. The advertisement in question depicted a robot,
dressed similarly to the way White dresses on the show, standing next
to a game board that was identifiable as the Wheel of Fortune stage
set.63 White, unlike other personalities depicted in the advertising
campaign, did not consent to the ads and was not paid for them.64The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that
White had alleged enough to sustain a cause of action.' In so holding,
59. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, establishing a
right of publicity beyond one's name and likeness, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended
the definition of "identity" to include one's "distinctive voice." Id. at 463.
In Midler, the defendant hired one of Bette Midler. backup singers to sing on
its advertisement, and sound as much like Midler as possible. Midler sued on a right of publicity
theory, basing her claim on Ford's unauthorized use of a sound-alike. The Ninth Circuit held in
favor of Midler, finding that there existed rights in a "distinctive voice ...deliberately imitated
in order to sell a product .... Id.
The Midler case served as yet another step in the development of the right of publicity
doctrine, marking a "final shift toward the evolving pattern of protecting all incidents of a
person's identity against wrongful commercial appropriation." Hetherington, supra note 30, at
12. The subsequent Vanna White case showed that this was not yet a final shift.
60. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).




65. Id. at 1397,1399.
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the court continued the theme it had set forth in the Midler case.'
While pointing out that the robot in the White case "did not make use
of White's name or likeness," the court reiterated that "the common
law right of publicity is not so confined."'" The court also noted that
right of publicity law "has borne out [Prosser's] insight that the right of
publicity is not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness."'
After analyzing the evolution of the doctrine by examining the
Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson cases, the court explained that
"[t]hese cases teach not only that the common law right of publicity
reaches means of appropriation other than name or likeness, but that
the specific means of appropriation are relevant only for determining
whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiff's identity."
69
Based on this formulation, the court of appeals decided that there
was "little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict." The
means the defendant used to capitalize on the identity-a robot in the
White case-were of no consequence. Also significant in this case was
that the court of appeals allowed White to have a cause of action even
though the advertisement arguably appropriated an aspect of the show
itself, and not her persona. In effect, appropriation of her persona in
the show was synonymous with the appropriation of her identity,
because it capitalized on her celebrity status as Vanna White.7
66. Id. at 1398.
67. Id. at 1397.
68. Id. at 1398.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 1399.
71. The decision was met by much criticism. A vigorous dissent from an order denying
rehearing called this a "classic case of overprotection." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d
1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992)(petition for rehearing)(Kozinski, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that the majority opinion granted to White a right of publicity in "anything that reminds the
viewer of her." Id. at 1515 (emphasis omitted). The dissent also surmised that if the ad in
question had not been associated with the Wheel of Fortune game show stage, no one would
have associated it with White. Thus, the court was "giving White an exclusive right not in what
she looks like or who she is, but in what she does for a living." Id. (footnote omitted).
Judge Kozinski's criticisms are thoughtful and well-founded. However, for the purposes of
this Note, they do not apply with equal force in the context of replica college jerseys. Selling
uniform jerseys with a player's distinctive number on them is a marketing of the player's identity
as an athlete. This is more in line with taking advantage of an individual's identity. While the
robot in the Samsung ad would remind one of Vanna White only when viewed in conjunction
with the Wheel of Fortune stage (accepting Judge Kozinski's argument), a replica jersey reminds
people of the athlete no matter what the context.
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Effect of Right of Publicity Law
Applied to College Sports Merchandise
The development of the case law, whether by interpreting state
statutes or the common law, has moved right of publicity law away
from the confines of protecting simply an individual's name and
likeness from unauthorized commercial appropriation. Whether
someone is named or pictured explicitly is no longer of consequence.
As all of the above cases show, there are viable causes of action under
the right of publicity where a celebrity's name or picture is nowhere to
be found.
Instead of name and likeness, it is evident that an individual's
"identity" is the interest to be protected from commercial
appropriation. If someone is identifiable in a particular commercial
use, then there will be liability for a right of publicity violation.'
A. The Jersey as an Athlete's "Identity"
It is not an extraordinary stretch of this doctrine to make it
applicable to the marketing of college jerseys and T-shirts that depict a
particular player's uniform number. 3 An athlete's uniform number is
ostensibly associated with him. Players are identified on the field by
virtue of their uniform numbers. Great players, college and
professional, are often honored by having their uniform numbers
retired-a symbolic gesture providing that no other player will ever
wear a particular number again, forever associating a particular player
from a specific team with a particular uniform number.74 Whether
college or professional, the athlete's celebrity status, which makes up
his publicity value, springs from his persona as an athlete. A jersey
that a player wears each time he plays, with a distinctive number by
72. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395,1398 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 951 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1988); Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)(all cases emphasizing
characteristics that are connected with a plaintiff's "identity").
73. It should be pointed out that this Note does not wish to apply the doctrine to simply any
type of merchandise sold or licensed by a college or university. It is only that merchandise which
directly capitalizes on an individual athleteb persona that is questioned. Replica uniform jerseys
fit the latter, while a T-shirt bearing only a college's logo would not.
74. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS, 1994 SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS INFORMATION GUIDE 68
(1994)(listing the uniform numbers retired by this major league baseball team. These numbers,
along with the players' names, are emblazoned on the outfield fence at San Francisco's
Candlestick Park, the Giants' home stadium).
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which he is readily recognizable, is a part of that persona. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that college sports, particularly
basketball and football, are televised nationally on a regular basis. The
uniform is an extension of the student-athlete's identity and would
seem to fit the description of a "general element[] of an individual's
persona which identif[ies] that person."'75 With this kind of a product,
the college athlete's identity has "merged" with the product, just as
when a T-shirt bears the actual likeness of a celebrity.76 While it may
be true that a purchaser of a college jersey may buy the item because
of identification with the school, it is equally possible, and extremely
likely, that the consumer is also buying the athlete's celebrity persona
as it is perceived.'
The problem with today's marketing of college jerseys is that it
blatantly takes advantage of a player's "star value" and recognizability
to the public. This is made clear by the reality that only certain jersey
numbers from certain schools are marketed.'8 This is by design;
the colleges and their licensees want to take advantage of the
popularity of well-known players.79 Even if this particular commercial
exploitation is not done in as blatant a manner as using actual
photographs,' it is an exploitation nevertheless. Under the way right
of publicity case law has developed, the question is not the means used
to appropriate an individual's identity. What matters is whether that
75. Margolies, supra note 31, at 364-65.
76 See Hetherington, supra note 30, at 33.
77. Id. at 34.
7& See, e.g., THE SPORTING NEWS, 1995 COLLEGE FOOTBALL YEARBOOK 11 (1995). The
description of the replica jersey notes that most NCAA teams are available, with the jersey
sporting a "popular player's number on front and back." Id.
79. See, e.g., SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 11, 1996, at 59 (advertisement for officially licensed
college basketball merchandise). The ad features a "replica game jersey" for sale, with 21 schools
available. Id. A chart lists the uniform numbers that appear on the jerseys, most of them of
current players at that time. Id. Among the jerseys available: Arizona #44 (Reggie Geary),
California #24 (Tremaine Fowlkes), Connecticut #34 (Ray Allen), Georgetown #3 (Allen
Iverson), Kansas #11 (Jacque Vaughn), Maryland #4 (Exree Hipp), Massachusetts #21 (Marcus
Camby), St. John's #13 (Felipe Lopez), Syracuse #44 (John Wallace), Villanova #30 (Kerry
Kittles), and Wake Forest #21 (Tim Duncan).
80. See James S. Thompson, Comment, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes
Enjoy a Common Law Right to Publicity?, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143, 175-76 (1994)(arguing
sale of trading cards featuring college athletes' photographs is clear violation of the common law
right of publicity).
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identity has been appropriated at all.' The marketing of these college
jerseys is such an appropriation.8
B. Policy Reasons Favoring the Athlete
The policy behind right of publicity law is challenged by allowing
the unbridled marketing of this type of merchandise. The student-
athletes are in the unique position of not being able to fully control
their own rights of publicity. Currently, universities control the use of
the players' likenesses and enjoy the financial benefits of this control.'
NCAA rules limiting the compensation that may be given to student-
athletes mean that the athletes whose publicity value has been used do
not reap any direct financial benefit from the use. Thus, the
universities profit without having to pay the athletes who are
responsible for certain merchandise being profitable.
One goal of the right of publicity doctrine is to prevent this sort of
unjust enrichment, which is attained by "[u]sing another's identity
without permission to promote the sale of one's own goods or
services . . . ."I The rationale is that this unjust enrichment is a
"theft of goodwill. No social purpose is served by having the defendant
get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and
for which [the defendant] would normally pay."'  In the context of
college athletics, the case for unjust enrichment may even be stronger.
Revenues for college merchandise have grown considerably over the
past decade 86 without the athletes getting any direct benefit. This is
true despite the reality that college athletics are a big business where
star athletes enable a college to reap great financial rewards.'
81. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
82. In White, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was impossible to delineate specifically all of
the methods by which identity can be appropriated: "[a] rule which says that the right of publicity
can be infringed only through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely
challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth." Id.
83. See Thompson, supra note 80, at 166. The universities are the only ones who may retain
such control, however. "The NCAA has specifically made it impermissible for outside profit-
seeking entities to use the likenesses of college athletes to sell their commercial products." Id. at
168 (citation omitted). See also Angelo Bruscas, Final Four Should Lift Merchandisers Out of
Sports Slump, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 14, 1994, at D8 (NCAA regulations prohibit
poster manufacturer from depicting the image of any specific player).
84. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 2.1(A).
85. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,576 (1977).
86. See Hiestand, supra note 1.
87. See Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes:
Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX L. REv. 59, 60 (1995)(arguing an "elite athlete may
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Concededly, the colleges and universities which maintain major
athletic programs generate a multitude of revenues apart from sales of
merchandise.88 Student-athletes do not gain direct benefit from these
revenues either. There is something inherently unjust, however, in
allowing universities to reap the total benefit of something that is so
closely connected with the student-athlete's identity and persona.
After all, the athlete has made a "unique contribution" toward making
a jersey with a particular number marketable to the fans of the sport.'
Taking advantage of this unique contribution of identity by the
student-athlete seems to fly in the face of a major policy behind the
publicity right: to prevent the unjust enrichment of parties "reaping
what others have sown."' 9
IV
Solutions to the Problem of Unjustly Marketing Players'
Identities
It seems fairly evident that a degree of exploitation of the college
athlete takes place through the marketing of certain merchandise
clearly identifying the player as well as the school. The developing
right of publicity doctrine tends to establish that this exploitation
violates the players' otherwise existing rights to appropriate their
identity. There are three possible courses to take in attempting to
make sure the student-athlete's rights are protected and that he may
reap the rewards of the stardom he has achieved as a collegiate
athlete. First, the NCAA and the courts could recognize the publicity
rights of players and allow them to sustain causes of action against
their schools for misappropriation. Second, the NCAA could change
its policy and allow payments to the athletes based on the
merchandising revenue. Finally, the NCAA could mandate a special
trust fund for the athletes, in which certain merchandising revenue can
singlehandedly enable a university to generate increased revenues by playing a sport for the
school.").
88. For example, college football bowl games and the NCAA basketball tournament
generate gross receipts of millions of dollars as well as payouts to the participating schools. See
Goldman, supra note 6, at 206. A college athletic program can also draw revenue from a variety
of other sources, including alumni contributions generated by pride in the school's success on
the playing field. Id. Television rights can be a huge revenue source also. The NCAA,
for example, sold the rights to its mens basketball tournament for $1 billion. See Ray Yasser, A
Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 123, 156
(1993).
89. See Hetherington, supra note 30, at 34.
90. Spahn, supra note 16, at 1029.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:133
go to the benefit of the student-athletes. This last solution could
ensure that an athlete reaps some reward from the marketing of
merchandise that utilizes his notoriety. None of the proposed
solutions, however, can be fully analyzed without first examining the
NCAA and its role in governing intercollegiate athletics.
A. History of the NCAA
The NCAA's beginnings can be traced to 1905, when a number of
universities formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS) to address the problems of violence in college
football." This organization, which some credit with saving college
football, later changed its name to the NCAA.9
Besides reforming college football, the NCAA's early years were
devoted to incorporating amateurism into intercollegiate athletics.
93
Prior to these efforts by the NCAA, "professionalism" was rampant in
college athletics.' These efforts to make amateurism part of the
definition of college athletics eventually became successful,9 and the
NCAA has now become "the largest sports organization to prohibit
member athletes from receiving compensation. '"96
As it exists today, the NCAA's membership consists of
approximately 960 four-year colleges and universities in the United
States. 9 The individual member institutions continue to exercise
control over their own athletic programs, but they are required to
91. See Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint
of the Student-Athlete, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1993); see also Charles Farrell, Historical
Overview, in THE RULES OF THE GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE SPORT 3, 7 (Richard E. Lapchick &
John B. Slaughter eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE RULES OF THE GAME].
92. Chin, supra note 91, at 1215.
93. The NCAA defines an amateur athlete as "'one who engages in a particular sport for
the educational, physical, mental, and social benefits derived therefrom and to whom
participation in that sport is an avocation."' Allen Sack, Recruiting: Are Improper Benefits Really
Improper?, in THE RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 91, at 71,74.
94. "Amateurism, at least as historically conceived, was largely absent from college sports
in the beginning of the twentieth century. Competition for cash and prizes ...as well as the
payment of athletes and hiring of professional coaches had invaded the arena of intercollegiate
athletics." Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 14 (1991).
95. "As the monetary resources of the NCAA grew, so too did its enforcement power. The
prime targets of those enhanced enforcement powers were the principles of amateurism as
incorporated into the NCAA constitution." Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 16-17.
97. Chin, supra note 91, at 1215.
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comply with the rules and dictates of the NCAA. 98 With this ultimate
power to oversee college sports, the NCAA's role is essentially one of
"dominance over most aspects of intercollegiate athletics. 99
Many of the rules promulgated by the NCAA center on the
concept of amateurism. Indeed, "[t]he NCAA openly states that one
of its primary purposes is to promote the concept of amateurism."'
Since the primary difference between amateur and professional
athletics is that professional athletes are paid salaries, the focus on
amateurism dictates that "[t]he lack of compensation for the student
participant permeates virtually all decisions in collegiate athletics
today."' It is with this background that we must begin to examine
NCAA policy as it relates to possible solutions to the problems
associated with the marketing of the student-athlete.
B. Allowing a Cause of Action for Right of Publicity Violation
Allowing the student-athlete to make a right of publicity claim
would break new ground because such a right for college athletes "has
never been established." 10 As illustrated above, through the
examination of the case law, a cause of action may be viable.
Remedies here would include injunctive relief or damages.'0
If a right of publicity violation is established, an injunction would
enable the athlete to stop the school from marketing the offending
merchandise.1' Another option is damages, which would usually be in
the amount equal to the commercial value of the identity that was
misappropriated by a defendant. 'I This could be evaluated by looking
at the amount of benefit that the defendant has received from the
unauthorized use.1 6
There are potential obstacles that arise in trying to implement this
solution. First, the NCAA's limited compensation rules could stand in
98. Non-compliance with NCAA regulations subjects a member institution to discipline
under the rules. Id. at 1215-16.
99. THE RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 91, at 7.
100. Yasser, supra note 88, at 126.
101. Shropshire, supra note 94, at 16; see also Chin, supra note 91, at 1216.
102. Thompson, supra note 80, at 156.
103. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at §§ 11.6, 11.7; Margolies, supra note 31, at
367-68.
104. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984)(plaintiff has absolute right to injunction when right of publicity violation has been
established).
105. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at § 11.8.
106. Margolies, supra note 31, at 367-68.
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the way-damages in this area could be construed as compensation for
the university's marketing of the identity-bearing merchandise.'
Applying such a restriction in this context would be untenable. The
money a student-athlete would receive for winning a right of publicity
claim is not direct compensation. Rather, it is damages for a tort
committed against the individual by a defendant. To block one's
receipt of tort damages based on NCAA regulations is an unfair
proposition.Y09
The second obstacle stands on firmer ground, but would also be
unjust if applied to the student-athlete. Part of the crux of a right of
publicity claim is that a plaintiff has not consented to the alleged
misappropriation of his identity by the defendant.' An argument can
be made that the student-athlete has impliedly consented to the
actions his university has taken with respect to marketing jerseys and
T-shirts. This idea of implied consent flows from the fact that
"[clollege athletes, by participating in intercollegiate athletics, agree to
abide by all NCAA regulations and bylaws, including those which
permit universities to use the likenesses of college athletes" for
commercial purposes."
It would be highly unfair to make this sort of implied consent
binding on the student-athlete, when an athlete must sign this
agreement in order to participate at the intercollegiate level."'
However, this would be a very real obstacle to the sustaining of a
cause of action.
C. Compensation to the Student-Athlete
As previously noted, the NCAA rules generally limit student-
athlete compensation to tuition, room, board, and books."2 The effect
107. See Thompson, supra note 80, at 173.
108. However, just such a thing has happened before. Former University of Nebraska
football player Jarvis Redwine, who played for the school in the 1980 , received an injunction
that prohibited pirateers from selling merchandise bearing his likeness. An injunction was all
Redwine received, however. "NCAA rules prohibited Redwine from recovering any award
constituting the value obtained from the use of his likeness and image." Shropshire, supra note
94, at 26 n.102.
109. Prosser, supra note 8, at 419 (consent as a chief defense to any of the privacy torts).
110. Thompson, supra note 80, at 176 (citation omitted).
111. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS, art. 12.1, reprinted in NCAA, 1993-94 NCAA MANUAL
(Laura E. Bollig ed., Mar. 1993). In order to retain amateur status and eligibility to compete in
intercollegiate sports, an athlete must comply with all the NCAA regulations. Id. If an athlete
refuses to comply with NCAA rules, he or she is ineligible for competition. Id. at 12.1.1.
112. Goldman, supra note 6, at 210.
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of this is that, despite the substantial amount of money generated by
college athletics, the student-athletes are denied a fair share of the
revenue they help to create.3
Some commentators have argued that the NCAA regulations
limiting compensation violate antitrust laws."4 It has also been
advanced that "[i]t is inequitable that student-athletes, who generate
millions of dollars for the university, must scrounge for basic expenses
and struggle through their classes." 115 Despite this inequity, courts
have legitimized certain NCAA rules, particularly those dealing with
limited compensation to the student-athlete."6
For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,"7 the Supreme Court put forth substantial dicta
illustrating the need for the NCAA to maintain a certain degree of
control over its member institutions and the student-athletes. In Board
of Regents, the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
challenged the NCAA's agreements with two major broadcast
networks that set forth the guidelines for televising college football
games." 8
The Supreme Court invalidated the NCAA's television plan and
sustained the antitrust challenge by the universities."9 However, the
Court recognized the unique status of the NCAA and its role in the
preservation of intercollegiate amateur athletics. I The Court went on
to acknowledge the unique nature of college athletics as an institution.
The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
113. See Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1299,1300 (1992)
114. See, e.g., id; Goldman, supra note 6, at 208; Chin, supra note 91, at 1244-45. However,
no court has invalidated the limited compensation rules as a violation of antitrust laws. Mitten,
supra note 87, at 60.
115. Goldman, supra note 6, at 207.
116. It must be emphasized that analyses of antitrust law and challenges to NCAA
regulations based on antitrust principles are beyond the scope of this Note. Any reference to
antitrust law is simply the result of antitrust being a popular ground on which to challenge
NCAA regulations, particularly those which limit compensation to the student-athlete.
117. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
118. The schools argued that the plans unlawfully restrained trade through the NCAAI
methods of controlling televised games. This plan limited the number of televised football games
and no member of the NCAA was "permitted to make any sale of television rights except in
accordance with the basic plan." Id. at 94.
119. Id. at 120.
120. The Court noted that the college athletics industry is one where "horizontal restraints
on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id. at 101.
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professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such
as, for example, minor league baseball. To preserve the unique
character and quality of the "product," athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of
the 'product' cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as
a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed. 121
Through this analysis, the Court legitimized the NCAA and its role in
the preservation of collegiate athletics and the amateurism that it
purports to display m
In a number of ways, however, the view of collegiate athletics as
an institution of amateurism is misguided. Even though the players
may be characterized as amateurs, the NCAA and its member
universities are not engaged in amateurism. To look at major college
sports in this way fails to acknowledge that "commercialism [is] the
driving force in college athletics."O' The revenue generated by this
industry belies a characterization as "amateur."1
The marketing of merchandise is an obvious form of
commercialism in college athletics. Universities take commercial
advantage of the popularity of college athletics through the
merchandising and licensing of college merchandise. Colleges and the
NCAA "market[] products through various licensing schemes, while
vigorously 'selling' the myth of the student-athlete to the consuming
public." 2 The money generated by the colleges through capitalizing
on the popularity of college sports substantially outweighs the benefits
given to the athletes who are largely responsible for the revenue.
126
The unfairness and hypocrisy of the failure to compensate the
athletes for merchandise taking advantage of their special
marketability is especially evident in light of the benefits that college
121. Id. at 101-02.
122. Indeed, a stated goal of the NCAA is the pursuit and preservation of amateurism in
intercollegiate athletics. See, e.g., Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and
Conflicting Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269,273 (1994).
123. Id. at 271. Davis argues that intercollegiate athletics have more of a commercial
character than an amateur one.
124. "The NCAA estimates that sports revenues at Division IA schools exceed one billion
dollars per year." Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, supra note 113, at
1314.
125. Yasser, supra note 88, at 156.
126. "For example, in 1987, the University of Nebraska football program reportedly
generated nearly $11 million in revenues, but distributed only $150,000 in scholarships to football
players." Goldman, supra note 6, at 257. Five months after the first of its back-to-back national
football championship titles in 1994, Nebraska had already made $2.18 million from licensing fees
just on souvenir merchandise from that season. Sports Briefing, supra note 4.
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coaches reap from endorsements.' Coaches earn hundreds of
thousands of dollars from shoe contracts and other endorsement
opportunities springing from their connection with college athleticsY
8
Paying college athletes is a controversial issue and one on which
there is no consensus. However, the notion of amateurism is not an
adequate justification for depriving student-athletes of some share of
the monies generated by their own unique personas and talent.
College merchandise, such as replica jerseys, depend on the celebrity
of student-athletes for marketability.'
D. Trust Funds for the Student-Athlete
To satisfy those wary of outright payments made to the student-
athlete, the NCAA might take its cue from the International Olympic
Committee (IOC). Under the IOC regulations, amateur athletes are
still allowed monetary compensation. Monies such as endorsement
fees are collected and entered into a trust fund, from which the
athlete's expenses are paid.' The money can be withdrawn after the
athlete's career is over.Ul In the United States, The Athletics Congress
(TAC) similarly regulates American track and field athletes. 13
Appearance fees to the athletes, living and training grants, as well
as endorsement revenues m  are funneled to trust funds set up by
TAC.'M The athletes can withdraw from this fund in specific instances
set forth by TAC.1
127. See Shropshire, supra note 94, at 26.
128. Id.
129. A recent example shows how strictly the NCAA enforces its amateurism rules. After
discovering a World Wide Web page created by Northwestern University basketball player Dan
Kreft, Sports Illustrated approached Kreft about contributing a story to the magazine. See
Alexander Wolff, Abandoned in Cyberspace, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1996, at 92. The
NCAA balked at allowing Kreft to write for the magazine, even if for free. "Invoking Article
12.5.2.1 of their constitution, [the NCAA] ruled that . . . Kreft . . . would be helping a
commercial entity, i.e. SI, sell its product-and that would constitute unacceptable exploitation of
his status as an athlete." Id. Wolff noted the hypocrisy in the NCAA denying Kreft's opportunity
in the name of preventing exploitation, while "allow[ing] $59.99 UConn jerseys bearing Ray
Allen's number to hang in sporting goods stores. ... Id. Ray Allen was the top men's
basketball player at the University of Connecticut in 1996.
130. Sack, supra note 93, at 82.
131. Id.
132. Shropshire, supra note 94, at 18.
133. Even prize money, in some instances, is allowed to be collected, as long as it is put into
the trust funds and administered by the appropriate governing body. Sack, supra note 93, at 82.
134. Shropshire, supra note 94, at 18.
135. Id. "Included are the costs associated with training and competition, health care and
agents' commissions." Id.
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Should the NCAA hold steadfastly to its notions of amateurism
and resist payment to the athletes, the trust fund alternative could be a
fair and reasonable compromise. First of all, it could be limited to
certain merchandising monies, such as those associated with selling
game jerseys or any other revenue from marketing a student-athlete's
name and likeness.1l 6 Secondly, a trust-fund system would be fair.
Trust funds would give the student-athlete who has achieved celebrity
status an opportunity to be compensated for what he has earned in
that capacity l 7 Finally, this option does not compromise the NCAA's
stated goal of preserving amateurism. Because the IOC has adopted a
trust fund system, "a similar NCAA plan would be considered within
the boundaries of 'amateurism."' 1 By realizing that even the most
sacred of "amateur institutions"-the Olympics-has recognized
compensation to the athletes in this form, intercollegiate athletics
could follow suit without compromising its goal of preserving
amateurism l 9  At the same time, this solution would fairly
"acknowledge the commercial nature of intercollegiate athletics, and
recognize that student-athletes are valuable contributors to its
success."140
Another advantage of this solution is that it can help protect the
student-athlete's interests.' TAC delineates certain instances where
amateur track athletes can draw from the trust fund; the NCAA and
its member institutions can create similar regulations. Hopefully, the
regulations would be designed to benefit the student-athlete, to ensure
that the athlete has the money needed to supplement the direct costs
136. It should again be emphasized that this solution is proposed only with respect to the
merchandising revenue attained through the sale of replica game jerseys, or any related items
which would tend to violate a student-athlete's right of publicity. Evaluating the wisdom of using
trust funds as a source of general compensation to the student-athlete, in lieu of salaries and as
an alternative to the current limited compensation rules, is beyond the scope of this note. See
generally Chin, supra, note 86, at 1249-50; Sack, supra note 93, at 81-82 (proposing trust funds as
possible financial reform to increase share of revenue to student-athlete).
137. See Chin, supra note 91, at 1250.
138. Id.
139. Arguably, this still would not be pure amateurism. See generally Davis, supra note 122,
at 271 ("amateur-education" model of college athletics is "premised on illusory assumptions
which fail to acknowledge commercialism as the driving force in college athletics.").
Nevertheless, the current state of college athletics is not pure amateurism either. See id. at 274.
140. Chin, supra note 91, at 1250.
141. This is extremely important in maintaining the "moral legitimacy" of college sports. See
Sack, supra note 93, at 81-82. "Efforts to show that some of [the] revenue comes back to athletes,
especially if it is in the form of educational benefits, would be a clear statement to athletes and
the public at large that college sport has the interests of the student-athletes uppermost in mind."
Id. at 81.
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of education. Similarly, after his college career is over, the athlete
could be allowed to withdraw the money. If the athlete does not go on
to a prosperous professional career, he has still been justly allowed to
reap his own rewards from his publicity value as a college athlete.l
V
Conclusion
The NCAA and its member colleges and universities bring in
substantial revenue through the commercialization of college athletics.
The marketing of college jerseys and T-shirts depicting the uniform
numbers of well-known student-athletes creates a unique problem.
This kind of merchandising takes advantage of the publicity value
earned by the athlete through his or her popularity and outstanding
performance on the playing field.
This marketing is a violation of the athlete's right of publicity.
Normally, an individual would be entitled to compensation for this
kind of appropriation. However, college athletes under the current
system cannot reap these benefits, even though they are uniquely
responsible for them. Allowing athletes to invoke their publicity rights
would be in harmony with the policy considerations behind right of
publicity law. A fairer solution would be to allow compensation to the
student-athlete either by direct payment for this merchandise, or by a
trust fund which would allow the athlete to be compensated, while still
allowing the NCAA to achieve its goals of promoting amateurism. The
trust fund solution is probably the best compromise between the need
to fairly compensate the athletes who give value to this kind of
merchandise, and the desire of the NCAA to preserve some
semblance of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.
142. This trust fund option has not gone unnoticed by the NCAA. At a meeting of college
athletic directors in June, 1996, NCAA executive director Cedric Dempsey suggested that the
NCAA explore the possibility of compensating student athletes, perhaps by "allowing the
athletes to accept money from a trust fund that would be tied to their share of endorsement
monies." Hopeful Signs in the NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 24, 1996, at 22. While Dempsey
backed off from the idea, he indicated a general willingness to address the inequities in college
athletics. Id. at 23.
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